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In this interlocutory appeal the employee alleges he sustained work-related hearing loss 
and vertigo when his left ear popped and he experienced dizziness, a loss of balance, and 
nausea while driving a truck at a high altitude. , The employee sought medical care on his 
own before the employer provided a panel of medical providers that included a 
chiropractor, two orthopedics and a medical center. The employee was examined by a 
doctor with the medical center that the employee selected from the panel who opined that 
the employee's condition was not caused by his work. The employer thereafter denied 
the claim. Following an expedited hearing, the trial court determined that to resolve the 
compensability issue the employee is entitled to additional medical benefits limited to the 
employer's providing a panel of physicians who specialize in hearing loss injuries from 
which the employee can select a physician to provide a causation opinion. The trial court 
determined that the panel offered by the employer did not meet the statutory requirements 
and that the causation opinion of the physician from the medical center was not entitled 
to the statutory presumption of correctness. The employer has appealed. Having 
carefully reviewed the record, we affirm the trial court's decision to award the additional 
medical benefits and remand the case for such additional proceedings as may be 
necessary. 
Judge David F. Hensley delivered the opinion of the Appeals Board, in which Judge 
Marshall L. Davidson, III, and Judge Timothy W. Conner joined. 
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Frank B. Thacher, III, Memphis, Tennessee, for the employer-appellant, Pat Salmon and 
Sons, Inc. 
Shelton Marzette, Memphis, Tennessee, employee-appellee, prose 
Factual and Procedural Background 
Shelton Marzette ("Employee") is a fifty-one-year-old resident of Memphis, 
Tennessee employed as a truck driver by Pat Solomon & Sons, Inc. ("Employer"). He 
was performing his usual duties on July 31, 2014, and while driving into Denver, 
Colorado with a co-driver his left ear popped and he experienced immediate pain, hearing 
loss, and vertigo. He called his supervisor and reported the incident. After describing the 
event to his supervisor, Employee's co-worker drove him back to Memphis. Upon 
reaching Employer's premises, Employee told his supervisor that he still could not hear 
anything. He got in his car and drove himself to the emergency room at the Veterans' 
Administration Medical Center ("VA Medical Center") in Memphis. 
Records of Employee's visits to the VA Medical Center were admitted into 
evidence. These records indicate the following: (1) Employee was seen on August 1, 
2014 for vertigo at which time head and chest x-rays and aCT of Employee's head were 
obtained and interpreted as normal; (2) Employee was seen on August 3, 2014 for vertigo 
and kept off work for two days; and (3) on August 26, 2014 an MRI of Employee's head 
and brain was obtained due to "sudden sensorineural hearing loss (Left) and 
dizziness/imbalance." The MRI report indicated "no acute infarction, hemorrhage, mass, 
abnormal enhancement or abnormal susceptibility in the brain." 
On August 8, 2014, Employer provided Employee a panel of four medical 
providers that included Concentra Medical Center ("Concentra"), two orthopedics (Drs. 
Mark Harriman and James Varner), and a chiropractor. The document indicates that 
Employee selected Concentra from the panel on August 8, 2014, and records from 
Concentra indicate that Employee was seen on that date by Dr. James D. Rucker. 
The Concentra records are limited to four pages that include a two-page report of 
Employee's August 8, 2014 visit with Dr. Rucker, a note dictated by Dr. Rucker the same 
date stating the diagnosis to be "Conductive Hearing Loss, Inner Ear," and a separate 
"Physician Work Activity Status Report" ("Status Report") describing Employee's 
"Patient Status" as "Modified Activity- Transferred Care." The Status Report restricted 
Employee's activity until the next medical appointment stating, "[u]nable to drive or 
operate machinery," "no climbing," and "may not function in a safety sensitive position." 
A section for remarks in the Status Report states: "No DOT driving. No work on 
machines. Follow up with ENT [at] VA [Medical Center]." 
Dr. Rucker's report states that Employee's chief complaint concerns his head 
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"which was injured on 7/3112014." It also includes Employee' s statement that "I was 
driving in to Denver and became dizzy and now suffer hearing loss." The "History of 
Present Illness" includes more details concerning the alleged July 31, 2014 incident and 
Employee's subsequent medical care at the VA Medical Center. The report details Dr. 
Rucker's examination and states that Employee "should continue receiving testing and 
treatment by ENT whose care he is already under." Of particular significance in the 
report are Dr. Rucker's medical opinions regarding causation: 
It is my opinion that this is not a work caused condition. This problem 
could begin at any elevation and could begin at work or off duty. It is [] my 
opinion that this reported condition is unlikely work-related. The above 
medical statements have been made within a reasonable degree of medical 
probability. 
On August 25, 2014, Employer submitted a Notice of Denial of Claim for 
Compensation, stating as the basis for its denial that Employee's "[i]njury did not arise 
out of his employment." A letter from Dr. Julia Archer at the VA Medical Center dated 
June 21, 2014, was admitted into evidence, which states "[Employee] requested I write a 
letter telling you that a change in barometric pressure can cause vertigo. That is true." 
Employee filed two Petitions for Benefit Determinations, both of which requested 
that temporary disability and medical benefits be awarded. Following an unsuccessful 
mediation, a Dispute Certification Notice ("DCN") was filed on July 21, 2015, indicating 
the "Disputed Issues" to include medical benefits, temporary disability benefits and 
compensability. A "Dispute Certification Checklist" included as page two of the three-
page DCN identifies four of the 35 listed issues as being disputed: 
Whether Employee sustained an injury that arose primarily out of and in the 
course and scope of employment with Employer. 
Whether Employer is obligated to pay for any past medical expenses and/or 
mileage expense. 
Whether Employee is entitled to additional medical care as recommended 
by a physician. 
Whether Employee is entitled to any past or future temporary total 
disability benefits, and if so, in what amount. 
On the same date the DCN was filed, Employee filed a Request for Expedited 
Hearing supported by his affidavit. The request indicates that Employee wanted an 
evidentiary hearing and asserts that "[a]ccording to worker[s'] compensation law my 
rights to medical care as an employee was [sic] violated, [plus] my rights to the panel of 
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physicians. The employee may select the treating physician." Employee's supporting 
affidavit, which was admitted into evidence by agreement, states, among other assertions, 
that "my company never sent me to [an] ENT." 
Employee was the only person to testifY at the expedited hearing. The transcript 
of the hearing includes statements by Employee that the trial court stated would be 
considered "as [Employee's] opening statement." Those statements questioned the panel 
of physicians that Employer provided and asserted that Employee was given "two 
orthopedic doctors to choose from and a chiropractor." In his testimony, Employee 
reiterated that the panel included two orthopedic physicians and "one chiropractor." 
Employee testified that the panel also included a medical center but not the name of any 
doctor with the medical center. He testified without objection that "I knew I couldn't 
choose an orthopedic surgeon," and "I knew I couldn't choose a chiropractor because I 
had - my injury was hearing loss and my ear . . . . " Employee also testified without 
objection that when he went to Concentra "I'm thinking I'm seeing anENT doctor. But 
the person I seen [sic] ... was Dr. Rucker. And he's not anENT specialist. He doesn't 
have any way to diagnose hearing loss or any vertigo." 
The trial court concluded that Employee "is entitled to additional medical 
benefits," and found that the panel of physicians offered by Employer ''was defective" 
and effectively provided only one physician for Employee to select, Dr. Rucker at 
Concentra. Noting that Dr. Rucker opined that Employee "should follow-up with testing 
and treatment with ENT specialist," the trial court was persuaded that, "in order to 
resolve the issue of compensability, it is necessary for [Employer] to provide a panel of 
physicians who specialize in treating hearing injuries." Consistent with Dr. Rucker's 
recommendation, the trial court, on August 19, 2015, entered its order granting medical 
benefits and requiring Employer to provide Employee a panel of physicians who 
specialize in treating hearing injuries from which the selected physician "shall provide an 
opinion on causation and, if necessary, an opinion on the period of disability from 
k. " wor mg .... 
Employer timely filed a notice of appeal and asserts two issues stated as follows: 
(1) whether the court erred by ordering a new panel of physicians when that issue was not 
listed in the DCN, and (2) whether the court erred by finding the panel of physicians 
provided to Employee was improper. The record was submitted to the Clerk of the 
Appeals Board on August 9, 2015. 
Standard of Review 
The standard of review to be applied by the Appeals Board in reviewing a trial 
court's decision is statutorily mandated and limited in scope. Specifically, "[t]here shall 
be a presumption that the findings and conclusions of the workers' compensation judge 
are correct, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise." Tenn. Code Ann. § 
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50-6-239(c)(7) (2014). The limited circumstances warranting reversal or modification of 
a trial court's decision are specified in the statute: 
The workers' compensation appeals board may reverse or modifY 
and remand the decision of the workers' compensation judge if the rights of 
any party have been prejudiced because findings, inferences, conclusions, 
or decisions of a workers' compensation judge: 
(A) Violate constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(B) Exceed the statutory authority of the workers' compensation judge; 
(C) Do not comply with lawful procedure; 
(D) Are arbitrary, capricious, characterized by abuse of discretion, or clearly 
an unwarranted exercise of discretion; or 
(E) Are not supported by evidence that is both substantial and material in the 
light of the entire record. 
Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-217(a)(3) (2015). Like other courts applying the standard 
embodied in section 50-6-217(a)(3), we will not disturb the decision of the trial court 
absent the limited circumstances identified in the statute. 
Analysis 
We are compelled, initially, to address what may be considered an inconsistency 
in the trial court's Expedited Hearing Order Granting Medical Benefits. The trial court 
recognized in its order that "to date, there is no medical opinion establishing that 
[Employee's] injury arose primarily out of his employment," and that "(i]n the absence of 
medical proof that the injury arose primarily out of the employment, [Employee] cannot 
establish ... entitlement to additional medical benefits under the statute." However, the 
trial court "concludes that [Employee] is entitled to additional medical benefits," and the 
trial court limited the award of additional medical benefits to requiring Employer to 
provide a panel of physicians who specialize in treating hearing injuries from which 
Employee can select a physician to provide a causation opinion. Employer contests the 
trial court's order, asserting the trial court erred in ordering a new panel of physicians 
"when that issue was not listed in the [DCN]." 
Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-239(b)(l) (2015) states that "only issues 
that have been certified by a workers' compensation mediator within a dispute 
certification notice may be presented to the workers' compensation judge for 
adjudication," unless permission has been granted by the assigned workers' 
compensation judge for parties to present additional issues. Tennessee Code Annotated 
section 50-6-239(b )(2) addresses what is necessary for a workers' compensation judge to 
grant permission for parties to present issues that have not been certified in the DCN. To 
determine what issues were certified by the mediator in the DCN as contemplated in 
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section 50-6-239(b)(1), it is necessary to consider the document as a whole without 
reading the Dispute Certification Checklist on page two in a vacuum. Here, "Medical 
Benefits" is checked as one of the "Disputed Issues" on page one of the DCN. Moreover, 
in the Dispute Certification Checklist on page two, "[ w ]hether Employee is entitled to 
additional medical care as recommended by a physician" is also checked. Employer 
contends that because other items in the checklist, specifically "[ w ]hether the panel of 
physicians provided by Employer was in compliance with the law," and "[w]hether 
Employee is entitled to another panel of physicians in compliance with the law," were not 
checked, the trial court was not authorized to consider the panel of physicians that 
Employer provided or to order that another panel be provided. Our review of the DCN as 
a whole, when considered in the context of the entire record, convinces us that the 
provision of medical care for Employee's alleged hearing loss injury was certified by the 
mediator as contemplated in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-239(b)(l). 
Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(a) (2014) addresses the medical 
benefits that an employer is required to provide to an injured employee. It requires an 
injured employee to accept those medical benefits in any case when the employee has 
suffered an injury and expressed a need for medical care, "provided that ... the employer 
shall designate a group of three (3) or more independent reputable physicians, surgeons 
chiropractors or specialty practice groups if available in the injured employee's 
community ... from which the injured employee shall select one (1) to be the treating 
physician." Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-204(a)(3)(A)(i) (2014) (emphasis added). In the 
case before us, and as noted above, the DCN clearly identifies "Medical Benefits" as one 
of the "Disputed Issues" on page one along with "Temporary Disability Benefits" and 
"Compensability." Additionally, the checklist comprising page two of the DCN includes 
a check by the issue "[ w ]hether Employee is entitled to additional medical care as 
recommended by a physician." Furthermore, the transcript of the trial court proceedings 
discloses that the parties represented to the trial court that the court's recitation of the 
issues, including whether Employee "is entitled to additional medical care as 
recommended by a physician," correctly stated the disputed issues. The trial court was 
persuaded by the opinion of the Concentra doctor, Dr. Rucker, that Employee should 
follow-up with testing and treatment ''with ENT specialists." This, the court stated, 
"persuades the Court that, in order to resolve the issue of compensability, it is necessary 
for [Employer] to provide a panel of physicians who specialize in treating hearing 
injuries." 
Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-239(d)(1) (2014) authorizes a trial judge, 
at the judge's discretion, to "hear disputes over issues provided in the dispute certification 
notice concerning the provision of temporary disability or medical benefits on an 
expedited basis .... " Here, not only was "Medical Benefits" checked on the initial page 
of the DCN and additionally identified in the checklist as an issue, but the parties 
presented proof on the issue at the expedited hearing. The trial court noted Employee's 
initial remarks at the hearing concerning the lack of Employer-provided medical care and 
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the physicians included in the Employer-provided panel, stating that the court would 
consider the remarks as Employee's "opening statement." Employee testified, without 
objection, about Employer's failure to provide appropriate medical care and about 
Employer providing two orthopedics and a chiropractor on the panel of physicians. 
Moreover, although cross-examination on the issue was very limited, Employer cross-
examined Employee about the panel of physicians. Our independent review of the record 
leaves no serious question concerning whether the issues of Employee's entitlement to 
additional medical benefits and to additional medical care recommended by a physician 
were identified in the DCN. Not only were these issues identified in the notice, but both 
issues were acknowledged by the trial court and the parties. We are convinced based on 
the record as a whole that Employer was fairly put on notice that Employee disputed 
whether he received proper medical benefits for his alleged hearing loss injury as 
mandated by the Tennessee Workers' Compensation Act. Accordingly, the issue of 
Employee's entitlement to additional medical benefits was properly considered by the 
trial court. 
Employer relies on Dorsey v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2015-001-0017, 2015 Tenn. 
LEXIS 13 (TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. May 14, 20 15), to support its position that the trial 
court erred by ordering a new panel. Dorsey is easily distinguishable from the case 
before us. In Dorsey the issue was whether the employee sustained an injury that 
primarily arose out of and in the course and scope of her employment. Page one of the 
DCN in Dorsey did not identifY medical benefits as a disputed issue in the case, and the 
checklist of issues on page two of the DCN did not indicate that medical benefits or the 
panel of physicians was disputed. Furthermore, the parties in Dorsey stipulated that the 
physician panel provided to the employee was "proper" and "legally compliant." 
Nonetheless, the trial court ordered that the employer provide a new panel of physicians. 
We vacated the trial court's order for the new physician panel because (1) there was no 
indication that the issue had been certified by the mediator on the DCN, and (2) the 
parties stipulated that a legally complaint panel had been provided. 
Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-239(c)(7) (2014) provides a presumption 
that the findings and conclusions of the workers' compensation judge are correct, unless 
the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. We conclude from our review of the 
record that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's decision to order 
Employer to provide additional medical benefits to Employee. 
Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the evidence does not preponderate against 
the trial court's findings and decisions at this interlocutory stage of the proceedings. 
Further, we find that the trial court's decision does not violate any of the standards set 
forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-217(a)(3). Accordingly, the trial court's 
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decision is affrrmed and the case is remanded for any further proceedings as may be 
necessary. 
~ 
Workers' Compensation Appeals Board 
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